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plan terminations—could qualify as being causally connected with the reor-
ganization. If this is so, and if these reorganizations can qualify as separations
from the service under the new Gittens test, then capital gains relief will
be available. This new approach appears more rational than the older more
formal approach to causation, since it considers what Congress surely in-
tended that it consider: the actual cause for a distribution.
Conclusion: Even though Gittens has liberalized the test for determining
the cause of a distribution when the distribution is made after an adoption
by a successor corporation, it is clear that the net effect of the decision is
the drastic curtailment of capital gains relief for employees receiving lump-
sum distributions made in a reorganization situation. The new test rules out
capital gains relief in a great number of corporate reorganizations. Except
in reorganizations where a substantial change in the make-up of employees
occurs, capital gains treatment will be denied. With this restrictive view of
separation from the service, the liberal changes made by the case in the
area of causation have almost no practical effect. One may assume that cor-
porate reorganizations will only rarely produce section 402(a) (2) relief for
employees in the future.
Congress, in its anxiety to protect against possible abuses under section
402, apparently desired the result reached in Gittens. But such broad-brush
treatment is of doubtful wisdom. Gittens makes manifest the need for legis-
lative reappraisal of section 402 (a) (2).
JOHN P. BIRMINGHAM, JR.
Antitrust—Summary Judgment—Discovery—First Nat'l Bank. v. Cities
Service Co. 1—On June 11, 1956, Gerald B. Waldron, hereinafter re-
ferred to as petitioner, instituted a private antitrust action under the Sherman
Act against seven large oil companies? Petitioner had an agreement to
purchase oil from the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which had
been organized to handle the nationalized oil holdings of the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company. 3 He was in turn negotiating to sell this oil to Cities Service
Co., one of the defendants. Petitioner accused Cities of joining in a conspiracy
already established by the six other defendant companies to boycott Iranian
oil. The purpose of the alleged boycott was to compel NIOC to return the
property to Anglo-Iranian.
Cities was in need of substantial amounts of crude oil and had long
desired an independent supplier in the Middle-East4 Petitioner's original
claim was that Cities could satisfy this need by purchasing from him the
oil which he commanded under his agreement with NIOC. However, accord-
ing to petitioner, as the result of a bribe from the other defendant com-
1 391 U.S. 253 (1968). The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Thurgood
Marshall.
2 Id. at 259.
3 Id. at 259-60.
4 Id. at 275.
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panics, Cities did not purchase the oil and joined in the conspiracy. 5 It was
petitioner's further contention that the bribe consisted of a contract for the
purchase by Cities of Kuwait oil, from Gulf Oil and Anglo-Iranian at a price
below petitioner's price for Iranian oil. In addition, it was alleged that Cities
had been offered a share in the Consortium° established by the six other
defendants to handle the distribution of all Iranian oil products.
The facts showed that one Jones, the president of Cities, had gone to
Iran at the invitation of the petitioner to evaluate the petitioner's offer.
When in Iran, Jones made a secret side trip to Kuwait, a fact which was
denied by Cities as late as 1960, and was not revealed until 1964 when the
petitioner was allowed to examine some of Jones' associates. 7 Although Cities
prepared a memorandum favorably evaluating the Iranian situation, 8 peti-
tioner was later told that Cities had decided not to purchase the oil. Other
facts presented by the petitioner showed that Jones had been under extreme
pressure at the time when Cities decided not to purchase the Iranian oil.
Jones was to receive a medal as oilman of the year from the American
Petroleum Institute, but the medal was not awarded to him, and at that
meeting the oil companies threatened to cut off Cities' supplies of oil if it
continued to deal in Iranian oil.° Evidence was introduced to show also
that the major oil companies were putting pressure on all who dealt in
Iranian oil.° On the basis of these facts the petitioner contended that Cities
was a conspirator in the boycott of Iranian oil.
In response to the complaint Cities moved to depose the petitioner and
requested that, because of the complexity of the issues, its answer be post-
poned. Both motions were granted, and because of the then existing "priority
rule" in the Southern District of New York whereby the party who first
moved to examine his adversary was permitted to complete all of his exam‘
ination before the other party was allowed to begin, petitioner was denied
discovery until Cities had completed its discovery?' From September 1956
until May 1962 depositions were taken for a period of 153 days, of which
7 were attributable to Cities. 12
In 1960, Cities moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the
theory proposed by petitioner, i.e., that Cities had joined the conspiracy as
the result of a bribe, had been conclusively disproved. Cities had presented
evidence showing that it had entered into negotiations for the purchase of
Kuwait oil before it was ever approached by petitioner to purchase Iranian
oil.la As for its share in the Consortium, Cities stated that it was so small that
5 Id. at 260.
6 It appears that "Consortium" was simply the term used by the Court to represent
the cartel established by the defendants.
391 U.S. at 301 (dissenting opinion).
8 Id.
9 Id.
la Id. at 278.
11 This rule has since been superseded by a new Civil Rule 4 which became effective
on July 1, 1962, and put the taking of depositions on a concurrent rather than priority
basis. See 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice lj 26.13[31 (2d ed. 1967) (hereinafter cited as
Moore).
12 391 U.S. at 263.
19 Id. at 263-64.
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it had transferred its share to the Richfield Oil Corp." In response to Cities'
motion, petitioner reiterated his contention that Cities had received a bribe,
and again requested that he be granted discovery. On March 30, 1961, in the
district court, Judge Herlands postponed decision on the motion for sum-
mary judgment, at the same time permitting the petitioner only limited
discovery for the purpose of resisting summary judgment." The judge's
basis fof so limiting petitioner's discovery was that petitioner's claim against
Cities was not substantial enough to merit "carte blanche" discovery."
Petitioner was allowed to depose Cities' vice-president, Hill, because
the judge felt that Hill was in the best position to provide information re-
garding the alleged conspiracy. 17 Petitioner objected to this order on the
ground that Jones, who had made the secret side trip to Kuwait, was in
the best position to provide the needed information. The judge, however,
did not change his order, and only Hill was to be deposed.
At this time petitioner altered his theory of the case and adopted the
position that Cities' motive for entering into the alleged conspiracy was
basically irrelevant for purposes of determining whether or not summary
judgment should be granted." In effect, petitioner contended that Cities'
abrupt ending of negotiations with petitioner was sufficient evidence in itself
to withstand a motion for summary judgment. It was urged also by peti-
tioner that the circumstances warranted the granting of discovery which
would reveal the reason for the sudden end to the negotiations." However,
the judge confined his order to the limited discovery set out above. The
deposition of Hill was to commence when Cities had completed deposition
of petitioner's associates, which was not completed for over a year. Finally,
Hill was deposed between September 10, 1962, and February 27, 1963, for
a period of six days.'
In May of 1963, petitioner moved for additional discovery and Cities
renewed its motion for summary judgment. In June petitioner filed an
amended complaint which presented more general allegations of conspiracy
than had been formerly alleged. In place of the specific allegations petitioner
alleged generally that Cities had joined the conspiracy at a time and in a
manner not known to the petitioner, and that the other defendants had
"`secretly threatened, induced and conspired with defendant Cities Service
to break off all dealings with plaintiff.' " 21
For over a year Judge Herlands held off ruling on Cities' motion for
summary judgment while he considered motions for summary judgment
against the petitioner made by the other defendants. Finally, on June 23,
1964, he again postponed judgment on Cities' motion and granted the peti-
tioner further discovery. This order allowed petitioner to depose all persons
who had dealings concerning Iranian oil, and ordered the production of
1 4 Id. at 264. Cities held a minority stock interest in Richfield.
16 Id. at 265. The Court based discovery on Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f ).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 265-66.
la Id. at 266.
20 Id. at 267.
21 Id. at 268.
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all documents and memoranda relating to (a) the Kuwait and
Consortium issues, (b) conversations and communications between
it and any other defendant between June 11, 1952, and October 1,
1952, concerning petitioner, his associates, and Cities' dealings in
connection with Iranian oil, (c) conversations and communications
between Cities and any other defendant between June 11, 1953,
and September 30, 1953, pertaining to negotiations between Wal-
dron and the Richfield Oil Corp. concerning the purchase by Rich-
field of Iranian oil, and (d) conversations and communications be-
tween any deponent for Cities and any other Cities' employee
involving the subject matter described in the preceding categories. 22
The deposing of Cities' executives was completed in August of 1964.
In September petitioner moved for additional discovery, and in October
Cities renewed its motion for summary judgment. On September 8, 1965,
Judge Herlands granted Cities' motion 23 on the ground that petitioner had
failed to comply with Rule 56(e) 24 by failing to show that there was a genu-
ine issue of material fact for tria1. 25 He also denied the petitioner's motion
for further discovery on the basis that past experience indicated that addi-
tional discovery would only permit the petitioner to conduct a "fishing
expedition."2°
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 27 After a rather
detailed review of the prior proceedings of the case, the Supreme Court, by
a vote of 5-3,23 HELD: the abrupt ending by Cities of negotiations with
petitioner for the purchase of Iranian oil was insufficient, in light of other
evidence, to raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial as to whether
Cities participated in an alleged conspiracy to boycott the purchase of oil
from the petitioner." Thus, summary judgment was properly entered against
petitioner.
According to the Court, all that is needed to resist summary judgment
22 Id. at 268-69.
23 Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 38 F.R.D. 170 (S.D.I•Z.Y. 1965).
24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) states:
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. Supporting
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would he admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When
a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does
not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
25 391 U.S. at 270.
26 Id.
27 361 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1966).
28 Majority: Justices Fortas, Harlan, Marshall, Stewart and White. Minority: Chief
Justice Warren, Justices Black and Brennan.
29 391 U.S. at 284.
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is that "sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown
to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the
truth at trial."30
 Since Cities, in the mind of the Court, had conclusively
shown that the facts petitioner relied upon to support his allegations were
not susceptible to the interpretation which he sought to give them, peti-
tioner was then required to produce further evidence of conspiracy if he
wished to avoid summary judgment. 31
 This, the Court concluded, petitioner
had failed to do.
The Court stated further: "[Mot only is the inference that Cities'
failure to deal was the product of factors other than conspiracy at least
equal to the inference that it was due to conspiracy, thus negating the proba-
tive force of the evidence showing such a failure, but the former inference
is more probable." 32 In other words, the decision not to buy oil from peti-
tioner was more probably motivated by an awareness by Cities of a variety
of unpleasant business consequences awaiting it if it should deal with peti-
tioner than by the receipt of a bribe.33 Therefore, it would appear that the
test applied by the Court is one under which summary judgment will be
granted when the inference sought to be drawn from the evidence by the
moving party is more probable than that sought to be drawn by the non-
moving party.
By incorporating a "probability factor" the test applied in First differs
significantly from the often suggested test for summary judgment. Under
the suggested test, if after assuming all ambiguities and credibility factors in
favor of the non-moving party a jury could not reasonably find for the non-
moving party, summary judgment would be granted.34 Furthermore, prior
case law35 and treatise writers" indicate that the decision to grant summary
judgment should be made purely as a matter of law, and that a court should
not weigh the evidence?' However, in regard to the evidence of Cities' mo-
tives produced by petitioner, the Court stated, "[U]ndoubtedly, given no
contrary evidence, a jury question might well be presented as to Cities' mo-
30 Id. at 288-89.
31 Id. at 289.
32 Id. at 280.
33 Id. at 279-80.
34 See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) ;
United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Well Surveys, Inc. v. Perfo-Log,
Inc., 396 F.2d 15, 18 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3185 (Nov. 18, (1968);
Caylor v. Virden, 217 F.2d 739, 741-42 (8th Cir. 1955); 3 W. Barron & A. Holtzoff,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1235 (C. Wright ed. 1958) (hereinafter cited as Barron
& Holtzoff); 6 Moore si 56.17[5] (2d ed. 1966) ; see also Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas
Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 628 (1944); Sarkes Tarzian Inc. v. United States, 240 F.2d 467,
470 (7th Cir. 1957); Summary Judgment Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56—A
Need for a Clarifying Amendment, 48 Iowa L. Rev. 453, 454 (1963).
35 See, e.g., Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532, 540 (5th Cir. 1951); Bartle v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 171 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 1948) ; Silvray Lighting, Inc. v. Versen, 10
F.R.D. 507, 508 (D.N.J. 1950).
se See 3 Barron & Holtzoff §§ 1234, 1247; 6 Moore If 56.15[1.-0] (2d ed. 1966).
37 See, e.g., Gauck v. Meleski, 346 F.2d 433, 435-36 (5th Cir. 1965); Van Men v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 43 F. Supp. 833, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
3 Barron & Holtzoff § 1234; 6 Moore fl 56.15[1.-0] (2d ed. 1966).
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tives in not dealing with Waldron. . . . "38 The Court then went on to say
that the probative force of this evidence was negated by the overwhelming
amount of contrary evidence of Cities' motives." If summary judgment were
to be granted, a jury question could not have remained unanswered. Conse-
quently the only conclusion to be reached is that the Court decided the
question. Since questions of law are not decided by a jury, it is fair to
assume that the jury question referred to by the Court was a question of
fact, and that in answering this question the Court weighed the evidence and
made its own findings of fact.
Although any decision that allows the judge to act as the jury is sub-
ject to question, First is especially susceptible to doubt in that the practice
of looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party suggests that the Court's reasoning is illogical. By its statement that
inferences of non-conspiratorial motives were more probable than inferences
of conspiratorial motives," the Court felt that it had shown that a jury
question did not exist, and that summary judgment could be granted. How-
ever, although one inference is less probable than another, it does not logi-
cally follow that the less probable inference is not probable. A less probable
inference could be considered one that is not as believable41 as another in-
ference, yet it is nonetheless believable, whereas a non-probable inference
is considered not believable. Thus, when the Court looked at petitioner's
evidence, if it had done so in the light most favorable to him, it should have
believed his less probable inference rather than making an assumption in
favor of the inference offered by Cities.
Even though a court may make an assumption in favor of the non-
moving party's explanation of the facts, it does not necessarily follow that
these facts will raise a jury question. 42 In First, however, if the Court had
made the proper assumptions, the evidence that the Court had considered
insufficient to raise a clear jury question would have raised that question,
and served as a basis for denying summary judgment. Thus, unless the
First Court meant to sanction the practice whereby the judge acts as the trier
of fact and makes assumptions in favor of the party opposing a motion for
summary judgment, the result reached by the Court cannot be sustained.
It is recognized and accepted that where it can be shown that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should be granted. 43
However, here, under the guise of determining whether a controversy over
a genuine material fact existed, the Court decided how that controversy
should be resolved.
The First Court's analysis of the summary judgment procedure would
38 391 U.S. at 277.
39 Id. at 277-78.
49 Id. at 280.
41 Black's Law Dictionary 1365 (4th ed. 1951) defines probable as "supported by
evidence which inclines the mind to believe, but leaves some room for doubt; likely."
42 See 3 Barron & Holtzoff § 1234.
43 See, e.g., Bartle v. Travelers Ins. Co., 171 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 1948); Lindsey
v. Leavy, 149 F.2d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 783 (1945); 3 Bar-
ron & Holtzoff § 1234.
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also appear susceptible to the criticism that it permits the judge to decide
questions relative to both the burden of evidence production" and the bur-
den of persuasion," with the anomalous result that the burden of persuasion
shifted the burden of production. Normally, a decision as to whether the
burden of persuasion has been met would not arise until all questions rela-
tive to the burden of production had been settled by the judge, and the
case had been given to the jury." Here, however, the Court stated that after
Cities had "conclusively" proved that the bribe could not correctly be in-
ferred from the facts," the petitioner had the burden of presenting evidence
to substantiate his claim of conspiracy." What the Court in effect said was
that since the defendant had persuaded the Court that its interpretation of
the facts was more plausible than petitioner's, the petitioner had to now
produce additional evidence to withstand summary judgment. Thus, the con-
clusion that the burden of persuasion was permitted to shift the burden of
production seems inescapable.
The introduction of a probability factor into the summary judgment
decision making process also presents the opportunity for the judge to make
factual determinations based solely on the pleadings. Since under the First
test the inferences attributed to the evidence by the moving party are re-
quired to be only more probable than those offered by the non-moving party,
rather than having to be more probable than any other explanations, it is
possible that summary judgment will be granted because of a failure on the
part of the non-movant to plead a possible theory of recovery. Thus, even
though the facts may possibly warrant recovery under an established theory
of law, unless the party has properly brought this to the attention of the
trial court, summary judgment may be granted. Such a situation was pre-
sented in First.
The Court stated that although the petitioner could have argued that
Cities' acquiescence in the threats of the other defendants was sufficient par-
ticipation in the conspiracy to warrant recovery," his failure to argue this
theory in the trial court prevented him from asserting it for the first time
in his Supreme Court brief:" The fact remains that in the instant case an
attorney's failure to plead the theory that would include Cities in the con-
spiracy resulted in denial to the petitioner of a trial of his case. One court
44 "Burden of producing evidence of a fact means the burden which is discharged
when sufficient evidence is introduced to support a finding that the fact exists." (Em-
phasis added.) Model Code of Evidence rule 1(2) (1942).
45 "Burden of persuasion of a fact means the burden which is discharged when the
tribunal which is to determine the existence or non-existence of the fact is pursuaded by
sufficient evidence to find that the fact exists." (Emphasis added.) Model Code of Evidence
rule 1(3) (1942).
46 In order for a jury to act it needs sufficient evidence to support its determination.
Thus, the judge would first have to decide whether there was sufficient evidence to sup-
port a jury decision before allowing the jury to make any findings of fact.
47 391 U.S. at 289.
48 Id.
49 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). It should be noted that both of these cases were
decided after petitioner had pleaded his original theory of conspiracy.
59 391 U.S. at 280 n.16.
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has held that even after a trial has been held and the case is on appeal, the
court may of its own volition supply the proper theory to the facts of the
case, and reverse the lower court decision." This court suggests that the
trial should not be regarded as a game, but as a method of arriving at a
just result.52 In First, by refusing to consider the petitioner's new theory, the
Court not only failed to recognize this rationale, but went so far as to up-
hold summary judgment in the face of an admittedly viable theory of re-
covery because it was not properly pleaded. 53 Furthermore, the Court's deci-
sion that the petitioner's new theory was advanced too late is somewhat
ironic since the very facts that the petitioner relied upon for his new theory
of conspiracy, i.e., intimidation of Cities by the other defendants, were
heavily relied upon by the Court to support its conclusion that the theory
of bribery initially advanced by the petitioner was not sufficiently plausible
to withstand summary judgment."
Aside from the issue of the theoretical soundness of the test set forth
in First, the case is also significant when considered in light of prior case
law. In the 1962 case of Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,55 the
plaintiff alleged that CBS had entered into a conspiracy with some third
parties to drive him out of business. The immediate purpose of this alleged
conspiracy was to give CBS a monopoly of UHF stations in the area, and
the ultimate purpose was the elimination of all UHF competition in the area
for CBS's VHF stations. To substantiate these claims the plaintiff introduced
evidence that CBS had cancelled its affiliation contract with plaintiff's UHF
station, and had purchased the station of one of his competitors. As a result
of having to compete with CBS the plaintiff was driven out of business, and
shortly thereafter CBS terminated the operation of its UHF station.
In opposing the plaintiff's interpretation of the facts, CBS relied on
evidence consisting mainly of affidavits and depositions of its executives,
who claimed that the actions taken by CBS resulted from business decisions •
rather than conspiratorial motives. The basic issue, therefore, was the motive
for CBS's actions. The district court granted summary judgment" and the
court of appeals affirmed. 57 The Supreme Court reversed, and in doing so
stated:
It may be that upon all of the evidence a jury would be with
the respondents. But we cannot say on this record that "it is quite
clear what the truth is." Certainly there is no conclusive evidence
supporting the respondents' theory. We look at the record on sum-
mary judgment in the light most favorable to Poller, the party
opposing the motion, and conclude here that it should not have been
31 Diemer v. Diemer, 8 N.Y.2d 206, 209, 211-12, 168 N.E.2d 654, 656-58 (1960).
52 In his dissent in First, Justice Black refers to the error of treating a lawsuit as a
game. 391 U.S. at 306. See also L. Yankwich, "Short Cuts" in Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41,
60 (1953).
33 391 U.S. at 280 n.16.
34 Id. at 278-80.
53 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
33 Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 802 (D.D.C. 1959).
57 Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 284 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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granted. We believe that summary procedures should be used spar-
ingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play
leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged con-
spirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot. It is only when the
witnesses are present and subject to cross-examination that their
credibility and the weight to be given their testimony can be ap-
praised. Trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury which
so long has been the hallmark of "even handed justice." 58
In First it was an uncontroverted fact that Cities was negotiating with
petitioner for the purchase of Iranian oil, and that those negotiations were
abruptly terminated. Though alone that fact indicates nothing, it becomes
very significant when Cities' motive is considered. As in Poller, the estab-
lishment of a conspiratorial motive for the defendant's behavior is crucial
to the petitioner's case, and thus Poller would appear to be a precedent ap-
plicable in First.
The Court, however, distinguished Poller on the ground that there,
because of the competitive relationship between CBS and the plaintiff,
it was plausible to argue that CBS had entered into a conspiracy, whereas
in First, because of the business relationship of the parties, it was "much
more plausible to believe that Cities' interests coincided, rather than con-
flicted, with those of petitioner.'' 5° Apart from the fact that the Court in
Poller did not base its decision on the plausibility added to the plaintiff's
evidence by its competitive relationship with the defendant, the First Court's
distinction would appear to involve a doubtful assumption." The Court
assumes that the business relationship of the petitioner and Cities is non-
competitive,61 in that petitioner was a supplier and Cities was a prospective
purchaser. In this limited sense their interests do coincide. However, in view
of the fact that Cities remained dependent upon oil from the other defendant
producers, it is conceivable that its interests would be most adequately pro-
tected, in the long run, if the boycott of Iranian oil succeeded. Under this
latter state of facts, Cities' interests are adverse to those of the petitioner,
regardless of whether in a normal business context their relationship is non-
competitive. It would appear that this "adversity of interest" in the particu-
lar transaction complained of is a more proper basis upon which to determine
the plausibility of the plaintiff's argument. Furthermore, in Poller the relevant
fact is that the parties' interests were adverse, and not simply that this ad-
versity was attributable to competition. Adversity of interest was no less
present in First, and thus the cases would not appear distinguishable on
these grounds.
58 368 U.S. at 472-73.
59 391 U.S. at 285.
65 After having distinguished the two cases, the Court referred to Rule 56(e) as
stating that one may not rest on the allegations in his complaint to resist summary
judgment, and, since the petitioner had made only mere allegations, summary judgment
could be granted. It should be noted, however, that Rule 56(e) refers to mere allega-
tions. Thus, the proved fact of the abrupt termination of negotiations, though attributed
to non-conspiratorial motives by the defendant, would seem to be more than just a mere
allegation, and sufficient to resist summary judgment.
61 391 U.S. at 285.
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In his dissent in First, Justice Black, who was joined by the Chief
justice and Justice Brennan, adopted the position that Polley and First
"cannot possibly be reconciled." 62 He felt that the warning in Poller against
using summary judgment in complex antitrust litigation was explicitly di-
rected to cases such as First." Although he acknowledged the fact that ter-
mination of the negotiations could be attributed to motivations that were
not illegitimate," in light of Poller he did not believe that the Court could
properly create a standard to determine which motivation was more prob-
able. 65 He stated that summary judgment, as applied in First, was not being
used as a time saving device, but rather as a method of permitting the judge
to "take over the jury trial of 'cases!" 66 Such discretion greatly increases the
chance that a case will not reach the jury, and, according to Justice Black,
it amounts to "depriving the parties of their constitutional right to trial by
jury."67 In light of the eleven years of litigation involved in First, and the
obvious factual determinations made by the Court, it appears that Justice
Black's observations are correct.
Justice Black was critical also of the district court's limitation of the
petitioner's discovery. In First, the only discovery afforded petitioner was that
available to him under Rule 56(f ).° This Rule, unlike the full discovery
provisions of Rule 26, 69 allows discovery only for the purpose of resisting
summary judgment. Since the old New York "priority rule" has been re-
pealed," the chance that future plaintiffs will be denied full discovery under
Rule 26 has been substantially reduced. The fact remains that summary
judgment was entered against the petitioner even though he was denied
full discovery. In an attempt to justify the apparent inequity created by
the strict limitation of petitioner's discovery, the Court placed great weight
on the fact that much of petitioner's case was based on information found
62 Id. at 303.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 305.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 304.
67 Id.
68 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) states:
(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of
a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affi-
davit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the appli-
cation for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
69 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 states in part:
(b) Scope of Examination. Unless otherwise ordered by the court as pro-
vided by Rule 30(b) or (d), the deponent may be examined regarding any mat-
ter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the examining party
or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tan-
gible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of rele-
vant facts. It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible
at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
76 See note 11, supra.
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in the depositions taken of himself and his associates by the defendants."
Thus, in the Court's opinion, petitioner's discovery was not in fact unduly
limited because he was able to utilize his adversaries' discovery. The obvious
error in this line of reasoning is that the information gained by the defendants
through discovery was already in the possession of petitioner and undoubt-
edly would have been introduced at trial without the aid of defendants'
depositions. In addition, when Judge Herlands refused petitioner's request
to depose Jones, he did so on the ground that Hill was in a better position
to give information about Cities' dealings in Iranian oil." The fact is that
petitioner already knew what had transpired between Cities and himself.
What he did not know was what had happened between Cities and the
Kuwait oil interests, information which Jones did have. Thus, the most im-
portant party to petitioner's case, the individual who could most likely give
information of any possible bribes offered or threats made, was not made
available to the petitioner.
The Court dismissed this entire question as moot on the basis that peti-
tioner did not in fact begin to depose Hill until after Jones' death. 73 The
Court went on to say that the testimony of Jones' associates revealed no
further information of conspiracy, and, furthermore, that it was reasonable
to assume that his associates knew all that he could have known." Neither
reason would appear sufficient to justify the basic error of the district court
in so limiting discovery. The former reason does not consider the fact that
petitioner may have responded more quickly to an opportunity to depose Jones
rather than Hill, and the latter reason amounts more to speculation than
to substantiated fact. There would appear to be little reason for the assump-
tion that the president of a company would necessarily inform his associates
that his action was motivated by an illegal purpose rather than business
considerations.
Regrettable as these factual determinations may be, more particular
attention should be directed to a statement in the decision that could have
far reaching effects on the future conduct of discovery. The Court did point
out that one is not barred from changing his theory of the case in response
to information received from discovery. 75 However, it went on to state that,
when the defendant is tangential, and the original allegations by which he
was linked to the other defendants are later found to be incorrect, the party
seeking discovery has the burden of showing a significant likelihood that
discovery of the other defendants would reveal something different regarding
the particular defendant's relationship to the other defendants." The Court's
use of the word "tangential" suggests that the party in question is not in-
volved and/or is unimportant, but in both instances a judgment has been
made that "begs the question." He is considered uninvolved and unimportant
because he is tangential, yet in order to be considered tangential the deter-
77 391 U.S. at 291.
72 Id. at 265.
73 Id. at 272.
74 Id. at 295.
75 Id. at 293-94.
76 Id. at 294.
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mination had to have already been made that he is unlike the other de-
fendants and not as important to the case as they are. Accordingly, it would
appear that the defendant party hardest to link to the conspiracy and
against whom discovery would be most needed is in the best position to
avoid detection.
Although this discussion has dealt separately with the motion for sum-
mary judgment and the motion for discovery, it is obvious that the two
are for practical purposes interrelated. Thus, when a less restrictive test to
determine summary judgment is employed, justice demands that the non-
moving party have available adequate discovery." However, in First, where
the test for summary judgment decidedly favored the moving party, the
non-moving party was bound by strict discovery restrictions.
This decision can be most mercifully described as unwise. in "one fell
swoop" the Court has created a test for summary judgment that permits
the judge to assume the role of the trier of fact. By refusal to apply a theory
not properly included in the pleadings but merited on the facts, the Court
has retreated somewhat from the more enlightened view that the pleadings
should be liberally construed. In addition, the Court has sanctioned a rule
for discovery which in application insulates from detection the party to the
alleged conspiracy whose relationship to the other defendants is least likely
to be known by the plaintiff.
It has long been recognized that summary judgment can perform a
valuable service in antitrust and other complex cases." However, if First
is an example of how courts will react in complex cases when confronted
with a motion for summary judgment, consideration of the abolition of sum-
mary judgment would seem merited." Although it may be said that the
abolition of summary judgment will force the courts to adopt more rigid
pleading requirements as an alternative method of dismissing cases early in
litigation, it must be remembered that the First Court already requires one
to stand on his pleadings while the Court determines, from the weight of the
evidence, whether summary judgment should be granted. As long as summary
judgment is associated with such an improper test, the procedure lies open
to abuse. Thus, in order to save this valuable procedural device and safe-
guard the rights of plaintiffs, it is recommended that the Court return to
the view of summary judgment expressed in Poller.
JEFFREY M. SIGER
77 See generally L. Yankwich, supra note 52, at 49.
78 See, e.g., 3 Barron & Holtzoff § 1247; 6 Moore ¶ 56.15[1.-0] (2d ed. 1966);
H. Korn & G. Paley, Survey of Summary Judgment, Judgment on the Pleadings and
Related Pre-Trial Procedures, 42 Cornell L.Q. 483 (1957).
70 See 391' U.S. at 304 (dissenting opinion).
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